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Abstract: We develop a theory of leadership that focuses on the role managers
play in motivating employees through their attitude towards employees. We model
a managers attitude as her perception about employees abilities of successfully
completing challenging tasks. We show that a positive attitude motivates employees
who are driven by monetary rewards. A negative attitude may motivate employees
who are driven by concerns about their reputation for being able. When employees
are driven by monetary rewards and care about their reputations, an increase in
the reward for successfully completing challenging tasks may lead employees to shy
away from these tasks.
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1 Introduction
A famous myth tells about Pygmalion, a prince of Cyprus, who carved a sculpture
of a woman out of ivory. Pygmalion felt in love with his statue. Through his will
and the assistance of Venus, the statue changed to a real woman, Galatea. In the
psychological literature, the myth of Pygmalion is frequently used as a metaphor
for two well-documented phenomena in organizations. First, high expectations of a
manager about a subordinate induce the manager to pay special attention to the
subordinate resulting in higher performance. This is the Pygmalion e¤ect. The
emphasis is on the manager working harder. Second, high expectations conveyed
directly to the subordinate also result in higher performance. This is called the
Galatea e¤ect. The emphasis is on the subordinate working harder. Both e¤ects
are examples of self fullling prophecies. The psychological literature provides a lot
of evidence for the relevance of both e¤ects [see, for example, Eden (1990), Eden
and Kinnar (1991), Eden (1992), Oz and Eden (1994), McNatt (2000), Shapiro et
al. (2007), Bezuijen et al. (2009), and Kierein and Gold (2000) for a meta-analysis].
Eden (1992), for instance, conducted several eld experiments on men who had been
selected into a combat command course. The experiments showed that manipulation
of both the instructorsexpectations and the traineesexpectations has large e¤ects
on traineesperformances.
The Galatea e¤ect is mediated by subordinates raised expectations of them-
selves. The way people see themselves drives many of their decisions [see Bandura
(1986) on the relationship between self-e¢ cacy and behavior]. People who think
highly of their abilities work harder, are more likely to choose challenging tasks or
are less likely to give up di¢ cult tasks than people who think poorly of themselves.
In a business setting, the relationship between peoples self perception on the one
hand and their motivation on the other creates a role for managers. Conveying
particular expectations to subordinates becomes a means of motivating them.
A good manager boosts an employees sense of self-e¢ cacy in order to induce
greater e¤ort and better performance. At least, this is the view that emerges from
the literature on the Pygmalion and Galatea e¤ect. There might be other forces
at work, however. For instance, employees should not be too condent about their
abilities. Overcondent employees may choose too ambitious tasks resulting in poor
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performance. Moreover, employees may have weaker incentives to impress their
supervisor if he already has a very favourable view of their abilities. A supervisor
having low expectations may challenge employees. These examples suggest that
there might be limits to the extent to which supervisors should boost employees
senses of self-e¢ cacy. The main objective of the present paper is to shed light on
the pros and cons of boosting employeesperceptions of their abilities.
We develop a model in which a managers attitude towards an employee is dened
by the probability she believes this employee can successfully perform a challenging
task. A manager with a more positive attitude considers it more likely that an
arbitrary employee can perform a challenging task than a manager with a more
negative attitude. In our model, the employee is driven by (monetary) rewards for
successfully completing tasks. Moreover, the employee is concerned about how the
manager perceives his ability. One reason for this motive is that the managers
perception may a¤ect the employees future career perspectives. Alternatively, the
employee may derive direct utility from being valued highly. The employee makes
two decisions. He either chooses to perform a routine task or a challenging task.
Next, if he has opted for the challenging task, he chooses an e¤ort level. The
probability that the employee successfully completes a challenging task depends on
his ability and the e¤ort level. The manager is a passive player. She forms a view
of employeesabilities. Furthermore, through her attitude towards employees, she
a¤ects employeesbehavior.
A managers attitude a¤ects the employees behavior through two channels.
First, by learning the managers attitude, the employee updates his belief about
his own abilities. For example, an employee who enters a company with a belief
that with a high probability he is able to perform challenging tasks adjusts his be-
lief downwards when he learns that the manager beliefs that hardly any employee
can perform challenging tasks. Of course, this channel requires that the employee
attributes a positive probability to the event that the managers vision contains rel-
evant information. Second, a managers attitude on employees inuences the way
she updates her beliefs about employees. The reason is simply that posterior be-
liefs depend on outcomes and prior beliefs. This second channel is important when
workers want to come across as able.
We derive ve main results. First, we derive the Galatea e¤ect. Employees who
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have a positive self-image tend to perform more challenging tasks and put more
e¤ort in them than employees with a negative self-image. This result is neither new
nor surprising. It stems from the following features of the model: (i) more condent
employees are more likely to complete challenging tasks; and (ii) e¤ort levels depend
positively on the probability of being able. The implication of our rst result is that
managers with a positive attitude induce employees to choose challenging tasks and
to put more e¤ort in those tasks. In our model, given task choice, a higher level
e¤ort is always good from the managers point of view. A stronger inclination to
choose the challenging is task is not always good. Whether this is good or bad
depends on whether the employee can actually handle the challenging task.
Second, an extreme attitude of the manager may distort self-selection. Even
though employees sometimes have an incorrect view of their own abilities, their
views contain some information. For this reason, a manager may want to rely on
self-selection: allowing employees to choose the tasks they want to perform. An
employee who has a favorable view of his own abilities may then choose challenging
tasks, while an employee with a more negative view may choose routine tasks. An
extreme view by the manager may distort self-selection in case a negative view
discourages high ability types to perform challenging tasks, or in case a positive view
encourages low ability types to perform challenging tasks. In some organizations,
managers try to break employeesself images to prevent them from taking unwanted
initiatives. In other organizations, managers may try to boost employeesself images
to stimulate risk-taking.
Third, a managers belief has important consequences for employeesincentives
to prove themselves. In the presence of a manager who holds a positive belief about
employees, a low ability type has little to gain in terms of reputation and much to lose
by performing challenging tasks. In case of a more sceptical manager, by contrast,
a high ability type has much to win by performing a challenging task. Indeed, we
show that a manager holding a negative belief may encourage high ability employees
to perform challenging tasks and to put much e¤ort in them.
Fourth, raising high expectations about employeesabilities is good for perfor-
mance when employees are motivated by monetary rewards. Then, higher self-
e¢ cacy always encourages an employee to expend e¤ort (the rst result above).
However, in an environment where employees are predominantly motivated by ca-
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reer concerns, raising high expectations can be counterproductive. As discussed in
the third result above, employeesincentives to work hard to come across as able
may be weak in case managers already have a positive view. Thus, which managers
in terms of their attitude towards employeesabilities motivate the employee the
most hinges on the specic environment in which a manager operates.
Finally, we show that an increase in the reward for completing the challenging
task may induce workers to shy away from this task. To understand this somewhat
counter-intuitive result, it is important to recall an important feature of models
with agents having reputational concerns. In equilibrium, expectations of reputa-
tions cannot be inuenced. In our model, this means that when the worker makes
his task decision, the expected reputation belonging to each task is xed. In a sep-
arating equilibrium, the challenging task yields a better reputation as a choice for
the challenging task suggest a high ability. An employee anticipates that the choice
for the challenging task will lead him to expend e¤ort with a view of impressing
the manager. In equilibrium, this e¤ort does not a¤ect the employeesreputation.
From the workers point of view the e¤ort is to a large extent a waste. Now con-
sider an increase in the monetary reward. The direct e¤ect of a higher reward for
completing a challenging task is that the employee expends more e¤ort. This, in
turn, implies that failing on the challenging task provides more information about
a workers ability. Failing becomes a clearer signal of disability. This motivates the
worker to put even more e¤ort in the task. This extra e¤ort is a cost of choosing
the challenging task. By choosing the routine task instead of the challenging task,
the employee steps out of the rat race.
All in all our paper contributes to our understanding of how a personal charac-
teristic of managers, here their views of employeesabilities, inuence the behavior
of employees and the performance of the company. Our analysis shows that a man-
agers view of employees abilities may be important even if it does not contain
any information. Furthermore, our analysis shows under which conditions a more
positive view motivates, and under which conditions a more negative view motivates.
This papers builds on three recent strands in the literature. First, our paper
builds on recent work that emphasizes that employees try to infer information about
their abilities from how they are treated by their managers [see, for example, Ben-
abou and Tirole (2003), Ishida (2006), and Swank and Visser (2007)]. The point of
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departure in these studies is that employees have imperfect knowledge about their
own abilities. In the social psychological literature, the evidence for this phenom-
enon abounds [Sedikes and Strube (1995), Klar et al. (1996), Baumeister (1998),
Kruger (1999), and Ackerman et al. (2002]. Imperfect knowledge about oneself
can lead to errors. People may perform tasks they cannot handle or abstain from
performing tasks they could have handled. Indeed, Ehrlinger and Dunning (2003)
nd that women disproportionately avoid careers in science because they under-
estimate their reasoning abilities. In Benabou and Tirole (2003) and Swank and
Visser (2007), managers give challenging tasks to subordinates to induce them to
exert much e¤ort. In this strand of literature, the emphasis is on how managers ac-
tions inuence employees self-e¢ cacy, and in turn performance. These studies thus
model the Pygmalion e¤ect. In the present paper, employees themselves choose
tasks.2 Employees are not inuenced by a managers direct choices, but by the
managers general view on employeesabilities. Our paper deals with the Galatea
e¤ect. Our nding that providing rewards may have adverse e¤ects is not new. In
Benabou and Tirole (2003) a monetary reward may crowd out intrinsic motivation
because a monetary reward may contain information about the task. For example,
a high reward may signal that the task is boring. In Benabou and Tirole (2006),
monetary rewards may be counterproductive because they reduce the reputational
benets of doing good. As far as we know, our explanation for the possible adverse
e¤ect of providing monetary rewards is new. As explained above, it hinges on a
spillover between monetary rewards and reputational concerns. Monetary rewards
may induce employees to exert so much e¤ort that employees prefer to expend no
e¤ort at all.
Second, our paper is related to studies exploring the e¤ects of heterogenous prior
beliefs. In many economic models, agents may disagree with each other because they
have private information. In those models, agents usually have common priors. Re-
cently, some authors have dropped the assumption of common priors. For example,
Van den Steen (2005) models managerial vision as the belief a manager holds about
2Köszegi (2006) also considers an agent who can select his own task. This agent cares about
his self-esteem. As a result, he may choose to avoid challenging, protable tasks when such tasks
may reveal information which diminishes his self-esteem beyond some cut-o¤ point. The results
by Köszegi (2006) depend on the existence of this cut-o¤ point, whereas we will not have any such
cut-o¤ value in our model.
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the right course of action.3 People may di¤er in their beliefs on the right course of
action. A strong belief by a manager may attract employees holding similar beliefs.
In our model, we think of the employee as a junior entering a new environment with
some prior about his own abilities. In this new environment, the junior may learn
that other people, such as his manager, hold other priors. We assume (through some
Bayesian updating) that this new experience has some e¤ect on the juniors prior.
However, even if we had assumed that the junior does not learn from the priors
held by his manager, heterogenous priors would have important implications for the
behavior of the employee. The reason is that posterior beliefs depend partially on
prior beliefs. As a result, when trying to impress the manager, employees take the
prior of the manager into account.
Third, this paper contributes to the literature on the various aspects of leader-
ship. By far and large, the main role of managers in economic models is the provision
of pecuniary incentives. The number of studies paying attention to other roles of
managers is relatively limited. Some examples are worth mentioning. As discussed
before, Van den Steen (2005) shows how a managers view on the right course of
action may attract employees sharing this vision (an earlier paper on vision is by
Rotemberg and Saloner, 1993). Hermalin (1998) shows how leading by example
may motivate employees. Benabou and Tirole (2003), nally, show how delegation
of tasks may encourage employees. The present paper is most closely related to Van
den Steen (2005) in that it is a personal characteristic of the manager that inuences
the behavior of employees.
This paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section 2. Next, we
present the analysis in Sections 3-5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The players and their actions
There are two players in the game, the manager and a worker. The worker must
perform a task X. There are two tasks, a routine one (TR) and a challenging one
3Other examples of studies using heterogenous prior beliefs are Banerjee and Somanathan
(2001), Dixit and Weibull (2007) and Che and Kartik (2008).
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(TC): X 2 fTR; TCg. Workers can be distinguished on the basis of their abilities
t = fA;NAg. An able worker (t = A) can successfully complete a challenging task
if he puts su¢ cient e¤ort (e) in it. A less able worker (t = NA) can never complete
a challenging task. We denote by Z 2 fS; Fg the outcome of a task with Z = S
meaning that a task is successfully completed, and Z = F meaning that the worker
failed to complete the task. We assume that the probability with which an able
worker succeeds at the challenging task is increasing in his e¤ort. To model this in
a simple way we assume that there is an unknown di¢ culty level y which is drawn
from a known, uniform distribution on the interval [0,1]. The worker succeeds at TC
if his e¤ort matches or exceeds y and he is able. Otherwise he fails. For X = TC,
Z = S requires that t = A and e  y. If t = NA or e < y, then Z = F . Completing
a routine task does not require e¤ort nor a specic type. Therefore, for X = TR ,
Z = S.
The manager plays two roles. First, she has an expectation regarding the workers
ability. This expectation is dened as the probability with which the manager
believes the worker is able, M . Second, at the end of the game the manager
updates her belief about the workers ability on the basis of the workers behavior
and task performance. As we will discuss below, to model the Galatea e¤ect, we
assume that the worker knows M . In fact, investigating the Galatea e¤ect amounts
to investigating the e¤ect of M on the workers behavior.
The information structure and the timing
Our model tries to capture a couple of features. First, a new worker enters an organi-
zation with a notion about his ability. Second, he learns the managers expectation
regarding him (M). This expectation may be based on many sources, such as (but
not limited to) the managers knowledge of the job, his experience with other work-
ers, his impression of the worker, or even prejudices. The important assumption
is that the managers opinion may contain relevant information, and that this may
change the workers perception of his ability. Third, when getting acquainted with
work, the worker develops a sense of whether he has a talent for the job. In line
with these features, we make the following assumptions.
At the beginning of the game nature draws y and t. Neither y nor t is observed
at any time by the worker and the manager. We denote by t the true probability
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that t = A. This probability is not common knowledge. Rather, we assume that
initially the worker believes that the probability that he is able is W , while the
manager, knowing W ; believes that this probability is M . The worker knows M .
To model the workers initial learning as simple as possible, we assume that the
worker attributes a probability M that M is the true probability that t = A, and
a probability 1 M that W is the true probability that he is able.4 In this way, we
model the Galatea e¤ect. When choosing a task and e¤ort level the worker believes
that the probability with which he is able equals  = MM + (1  M)W . To
minimize burdensome notation, we assume that the workers initial belief about the
probability that t = A (W ) does not a¤ect the managers belief that t = A. To
model that the worker develops a sense of whether he has a talent for the job, we
assume that the worker receives a private signal about his ability: s 2 fA;NAg, with
Pr (s = t) = ; where 1
2
<  < 1; and Pr (s 6= t) = 1  . Both the manager and the
worker know that s contains information about the workers ability. Throughout,
we refer to a worker who has received s = A (s = NA) as an A worker (NA worker).
Having processed the information about his ability, the worker chooses a task X
next. In case X = TC, the worker also chooses e. After the worker has expended
e¤ort (provided X = TC), it becomes clear whether or not the challenging task was
completed successfully. At the end of the game, the manager forms a belief about
the workers ability. The manager observes X. Moreover, if X = TC, she observes
Z. However, the manager does not observe t, y, e and s. The distribution of y is
common knowledge. The manager updates his beliefs about the probability that the
worker is able using Bayesrule. We denote by ^ () this posterior probability.
Payo¤s, strategies, and equilibria
Successfully completing a task yields a reward to the worker, WX . Furthermore, the
worker is concerned with how the manager views his ability. Finally, the worker is
e¤ort averse. Specically, we assume that the workers preferences are described by
4A motivation for this structure is that there are two types of managers. Managers who have
learnt from their experience and have developed a correct attitude towards workers, and managers
who have not learnt anything and whose attitudes do not contain any information. The probability
that a manager is of the rst type equals M .
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the following three equations:
U (TC; e; S) = WTC + ^ (TC; S)  1
2
e2 (1)
U (TC; e; F ) = ^ (TC; F )  1
2
e2 (2)
U (TR) = WTR + ^ (TR) (3)
where  denotes the weight the worker attributes to his reputation. Equations (1)
and (2) denote the workers payo¤ if he chooses a challenging task and succeeds re-
spectively fails to complete it. Equation (3) gives the workers payo¤, if he performs
the routine task.
The strategy of the worker consists of two parts. First, he chooses a task
 : (s)! fTR; TCg. Second, the worker chooses an e¤ort level e : (s;X)! [0;1).
The manager uses a belief updating function ^ : (X;Z) ! [0; 1]. We apply the
concept of Perfect Bayesian equilibrium to solve the game. Our focus is on equilibria
in pure strategies. It is well-known that in the present kind of games, two types
of equilibria in pure strategies exist: separating equilibria and pooling equilibria.
In a separating equilibrium, the manager infers the workers type (note that in
the present model, s is the workers type) from X. In a pooling equilibrium, she
does not. In the present model, A workers are better equipped to perform the
challenging task than NA workers. For this reason, if a separating equilibrium
exists it is one in which A workers perform TC and NA workers TR. We denote
by  (X) the managers belief about the probability that the worker is of type A.
In a separating equilibrium,  (TC) = 1 and  (TR) = 0. In a pooling equilibrium
where both types of workers choose TR, the manager does not learn anything about
the workers ability  (TR) = M . In a pooling equilibrium where both types
of workers choose TC, posterior beliefs depend on task performance. We assume
that the parameters of the model are such that in any equilibrium e (s;X) < 1 for
all s and X. The implication of this assumption is that regardless of the workers
ability, in equilibrium there exists a strictly positive probability that the worker fails
to complete the challenging task. As mentioned earlier, the manager is a passive
player. Her inuence on the worker runs through M . Below we treat the model as
if the manager wants workers to expend much e¤ort. Moreover, the manager may
want workers to self-select: A workers to perform TC, and NA workers to perform
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TR.
The analysis proceeds as follows. In Section 3 we consider the case where reputa-
tional concerns play no role. Instead, the worker is incentivized through performance
wage. In Section 4 we consider the opposite case, namely where there is no perfor-
mance wage and the worker is stimulated (or not) through his reputational concerns
only. Finally, in Section 5 we discuss how performance wage and reputational con-
cerns interact.
3 No reputational concerns ( = 0)
In this section, we assume that workers are not concerned about their reputation
( = 0) and WTC > WTR > 0. The analysis consists of three steps. First, we
determine how much e¤ort the worker puts in a challenging task. Next, we identify
the conditions under which a separating equilibrium and pooling equilibria exist.
Finally, we examine how the workers perception of his ability in general (), and the
managers perception of the workers ability in particular (M), a¤ect the workers
e¤ort and task choices.
First, consider the workers e¤ort decision. As the completion of a routine task
does not require any e¤ort, suppose that X = TC. Then a workers expected utility
equals
E [U (TC; e; Zjs)] = Pr (t = Ajs) Pr (y  e)WTC   1
2
e2
= Pr (t = Ajs) eWTC   1
2
e2 (4)
where Pr (t = Ajs) can be interpreted as the workers self image after observing his
signal s. Maximizing (4) with respect to e yields
e (s) = Pr (t = Ajs)WTC (5)
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with
Pr(t = Ajs = A) = 
+ (1  ) (1  ) > (6)
Pr(t = Ajs = NA) =  (1  )
 (1  ) + (1  ) 
Equation (5) shows that a workers e¤ort depends positively on his perception of
his ability. Together (5) and (6) imply that A workers put more e¤ort in TC than
NA workers. As M a¤ects  positively [recall that  = MM + (1  M)W ],
and in turn  a¤ects Pr (t = Ajs) positively, the more positive the managers view
of workers ability is, the more e¤ort that worker expends. This is one form of the
Galatea e¤ect: higher expectations lead to higher expected performance.
Let us now consider the workers task choice. In a separating equilibrium, an A
worker chooses X = TC, and an NA worker X = TR. Neither type should have an
incentive to deviate. When choosing a task, a worker anticipates how much e¤ort
he will put in a challenging task. Using (5) and (6), one can show that a separating
equilibrium exists if the following two conditions are satised
E [U (TC; eSE (A) ; Z) js = A]  U (TR)
1
2


+ (1  ) (1  )
2
(WTC)
2  WTR (7)
and
E [U (TC; eSE (NA) ; Z) js = NA] < U (TR)
1
2

 (1  )
 (1  ) + (1  ) 
2
(WTC)
2 < WTR (8)
where eSE (s) is the equilibrium e¤ort by an s type in a separating equilibrium
[see (5)]. As  > 1
2
, the term in large brackets in (7) is higher than the term in
large brackets in (8). It follows that for some ranges of WTC and WTR a separating
equilibrium exists. Equations (7) and (8) are also the conditions for the pooling
equilibria. If (7) is violated, a pooling equilibrium exists where both types of workers
choose the routine task. If, by contrast, (8) is violated, a pooling equilibrium exists
in which both types perform the challenging task.
For completeness, we should give the posterior probabilities that the worker is
12
smart. In the present model, these probabilities do not inuence the payo¤s of the
worker ( = 0), and thus they do not a¤ect the workers behavior. For this reason,
we postpone a discussion about the posteriors to the next section where the focus
of the analysis is on reputational concerns.
There remains the question how changes in the parameters of the model a¤ect
the incentive compatibility constraints (7) and (8). Clearly, the more informative
the workers signal s is (higher ), the wider is the range of parameters for which
a separating equilibrium exists. Moreover, through , a rise in M increases the
left-hand side of both (7) and (8). As a result, a more positive view of the workers
ability held by the manager strengthens both types of workersincentives to perform
the challenging task. This can be interpreted as a second form of the Galatea e¤ect.
Higher expectations induce workers to choose more challenging tasks. Note that
the Galatea e¤ect on e¤ort is always good from the managers perspective. Given
that a worker performs a challenging task, the manager wants him to work hard on
it. The Galatea e¤ect on task choice may, however, make the manager worse o¤.
For instance, it may induce (NA) workers to perform challenging tasks, while the
manager wants them to perform routine tasks.
4 Only reputational concerns (WTC = WTR = 0)
We now turn to the case where workers are not motivated by means of wages
(WTC = WTR = 0). Rather workers are driven by concerns about their reputa-
tion, so  > 0. We identify the conditions under which a separating equilibrium
exists in which an A worker chooses TC and an NA worker TR. We proceed as
follows. Assuming a separating equilibrium, we derive the posterior probabilities of
the workers abilities. Next, we determine the e¤ort level a worker puts in a chal-
lenging task. Subsequently, we derive the incentive compatibility constraints for the
separating equilibrium. Finally, we use numerical simulations to show the existence
of a separating equilibrium.
When updating her beliefs about the workers ability, the manager observes
(i) the task X, and (ii) if X = TC, performance (Z). Moreover, she anticipates
some e¤ort from an A worker doing the challenging task, eantSE (A). From Z = S,
the manager infers that the worker is able, as only able workers can complete a
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challenging task. We denote this by ^ (TC; S) = 1. If Z = F , the manager infers
that the worker has received a positive signal. Bayesrule implies
^
 
TC; F ; eantSE (A)

=
M [1  eantSE (A)]
M [1  eantSE (A)] + (1  M) (1  )
(9)
Two features of (9) are worth emphasizing. First, the more e¤ort is anticipated,
the stronger failing on TC is a signal of incompetence: ^ (TC; F ; eantSE (A)) depends
negatively on eantSE (A). Second, the posterior depends on the managers prior belief
about the workers ability, M . A worker failing on TC does not severely damage
his reputation if M is high.
If X = TR, then Bayesrule implies
^ (TR) =
M (1  )
M (1  ) + (1  M)  (10)
Note that the reputation of a worker performing TR also depends positively on M .
As a consequence, a manager with a positive view of workers (high M) concludes
from X = TR that it is likely that the worker has received a wrong signal. In
contrast, if M is low, X = TR conrms the managers initial view.
Now consider the workers e¤ort choice. Suppose X = TC. When choosing
e¤ort, the workers expected utility equals
E [U (TC; e; Zjs)] = Pr (t = Ajs) Pr (y  e) ^ (TC; S) + Pr (y > e) ^  TC; F ; eantSE (A)
+Pr (t = NAjs)^  TC; F ; eantSE (A)  12e2
= Pr (t = Ajs) e

1  M [1  e
ant
SE (A)]
M [1  eantSE (A)] + (1  M) (1  )

(11)
+
M [1  eantSE (A)]
M [1  eantSE (A)] + (1  M) (1  )
  1
2
e2
Maximizing (11) with respect to e yields
e (s) = Pr (t = Ajs)

1  M [1  e
ant
SE (A)]
M [1  eantSE (A)] + (1  M) (1  )

(12)
In equilibrium, the anticipated e¤ort level is equal to the optimal e¤ort level. Thus
the equilibrium e¤ort level for an A agent, denoted by eSE (A) ; is the e¤ort level
e (A) which solves Equation (12) under the constraint that eantSE (A) = e (A) :
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Equation (12) is key in our model. The term in square brackets is the di¤erence
between the reputation from successfully performing TC on the one hand, and the
reputation from failing on TC on the other. We refer to this term as the reputational
gap. A wider gap encourages a worker to exert e¤ort. It is easy to check that for a
given e¤ort level, an increase in M narrows the reputational gap. Thus, through the
channel of reputation, a low expectation held by the manager encourages a worker to
work hard on the challenging task. The intuition is that a worker facing a sceptical
manager (low M) has a lot to win in terms of reputation by successfully completing
a challenging task.5 Equation (12) also shows that an A worker exerts more e¤ort
than an NA worker would exert if he were to opt for TC. To see this, note that
both types of workers would gain equally much by succeeding instead of failing, but
that an A worker is more convinced that he is able [Pr(t = AjA) > Pr (t = AjNA)].
The upshot is that the e¤ect of M on e¤ort is more complicated in case a
reputation for being able motivates the worker than when monetary rewards moti-
vate the worker. In both cases, the Galatea e¤ect is present [through Pr (t = Ajs)].
According to this e¤ect, an increase in M induces a worker to exert more e¤ort.
In the case of reputational concerns there is a counterbalancing e¤ect through the
reputational gap. As a result of the latter e¤ect, for values of M close to 1, e¤ort
is close to zero. A manager who is almost sure that a worker is able attributes
failure to bad luck (or an understandable lack of e¤ort), but not to low ability. For
low values of M , the level of e¤ort crucially depends on the probability that the
workers signal is correct, . For high  and low M , the reputational gap is wide
and an A worker has a positive self-image in spite of the managers negative view.
In this situation, the worker exerts much e¤ort. For low values of  and M , the
worker has a bad self-image, inducing him to exert little e¤ort. Figure 1 depicts
the relationship between M and e¤ort for various values of  under the assumption
that s = A and e (A) = eSE (A).
Let us now examine the incentive compatibility constraints for a separating equi-
5The parameter  has a similar e¤ect on the reputational gap as M . In a separating equilibrium,
the higher is , the higher is the probability that task choice contains information about the workers
ability. Performance becomes relatively less important. Therefore, the higher is , the narrower is
the reputational gap.
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Figure 1: Optimal e¤ort in the separating equilibrium as function of M when wages
are xed. Parameters: M = 0:5; W = 0:5;  = 1:
librium. An A worker chooses X = TC rather than X = TR if8><>:

+(1 )(1 )e

SE (A)+
(1 eSE(A))
+(1 )(1 ) +
(1 )(1 )
+(1 )(1 )

^ (TC; F; eSE (A))
9>=>;
 1
2
[eSE (A)]
2  ^ (TR) (13)
An NA worker chooses X = TR rather than X = TC if8><>:
(1 )
(1 )+(1 )e

SE (NA)+
(1 )(1 eSE(NA))
(1 )+(1 ) +
(1 )
(1 )+(1 )

^ (TC; F; eSE (A))
9>=>;
 1
2
[eSE (NA)]
2  ^ (TR) (14)
Consider the incentive compatibility constraint for an A worker (13), to which we
refer as ICC 1. For the moment, assume that W = M . Then, the term in
parentheses equals 
+(1 )(1 ) . The reason is that in equilibrium, the expected
reputation equals the prior expectation. It is easy to see that the left hand-side of
16
ICC 1 is always greater than zero.6 An implication is that for su¢ ciently high values
of , ICC 1 is always satised [if  is close to 1, ^ (TR) = 0, see (10). For values of 
close to 1
2
, by contrast, ICC 1 is violated. If  = 1
2
, the expected reputation resulting
from TC is equal to the expected reputation from TR. TC, however, involves costly
e¤ort.
Now drop the assumption that W = M , and consider the e¤ect of M on ICC
1. First, note that one of the e¤ects of a decrease in M strengthens a workers
incentive to prove himself to the manager. A sceptical manager triggers a condent
worker to show that he is able to perform the challenging task successfully. Choosing
the routine task, by contrast, conrms the manager in her belief. The implication
is that for values of M much lower than W , an A worker is strongly inclined to
perform TC. Next note that if M is close to 1, task performance does not have a
large impact on reputations. As a result, the worker has hardly incentives to put
e¤ort in the task. The cost of performing the challenging task is therefore small.
For the worker, the benet of performing the challenging task is that this suggests
that he has received a favorable signal of his ability. Thus, for both M being close
to zero and M being close to 1, an A worker tends to perform the challenging task.
Does an A worker also prefer TC for moderate values of M? We now show
that for a wide range of parameters the answer to this question is in the a¢ rma-
tive. A clear benet of choosing TC is that if the worker successfully completes
the task his ability is beyond doubt, ^ (TC; S) = 1. The reputational benet of
TR lies in preventing the possibility of failing on a challenging task. The expres-
sion [^ (TR)  ^ (TC; F; eSE (A))] denotes the reputational loss of failing on TC
relative to performing TR. How bad is failing on TC? In a separating equilib-
rium, the manager makes two inferences from failing on TC. First, the choice
for TC shows that the worker has received a positive signal. In isolation, choos-
ing TC thus improves the workers reputation. Second, failing on TC shows that
either the workers signal was incorrect or that e¤ort was too low for the task.
Bad performance damages the workers reputation. So, for a workers reputa-
tion task choice is important as well as task performance. Task choice dominates
6First note that as eSE (A) is optimal, we have E [U (TC; e

SE (A) ; ZjA)] > E [U (TC; 0; ZjA)]
= ^ (TC;F; eSE (A)) : Second note that ^ (TC;F; e

SE (A)) > 0; because we focus on the case
where a worker can fail even if he is able (eSE (A) < 1).
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Figure 2: The potential reputational loss of doing TC;
[^ (TR)  ^ (TC; F; eSE (A))] ; as a function of M for various levels of .
Parameters: M = 0:5; W = 0:5;  = 1:
when the signal the worker receives contains much information about his ability:
[^ (TR)  ^ (TC; F; eSE (A))] is decreasing in . Figure 2 illustrates. It shows the
relationship between [^ (TR)  ^ (TC; F; eSE (A))] on the one hand and M on the
other for various values of . Note that [^ (TR)  ^ (TC; F; eSE (A))] is negative un-
less  is (very) close to 0.5. In fact our numerical analysis shows that for  > 0:56,
failing on TC leads to a better reputation than TR for all M Then with a view on
his reputation an A worker has no reason to choose TR. Figure 2 also illustrates
that the di¤erence between ^ (TR) and ^ (TC; F; eSE (A)) is generally large, be it
positive of negative, for moderate values of M . The reason is that managers with
strong opinions are less inclined to change their views. For instance, a manager
with an extremely positive view of a worker attributes failing on TC to bad luck.
Managers with more moderate views are more responsive to information on task
choice and task performance.
All in all ICC 1 is a mild condition. Violation requires a value of  close to 0.5.
Moreover, violation is more likely for moderate values of M .
We have now argued that in a separating equilibrium, an A worker prefers TC
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M  = 0:51  = 0:52  = 0:53  = 0:55
0.05 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
0.10 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
0.15 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
0.20 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
0.225 Sep.Eq. ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
0.25 ICC1 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
0.30 ICC1 Sep.Eq. ICC2 ICC2
0.35 ICC1 Sep.Eq. ICC2 ICC2
0.40 ICC1 ICC1 ICC2 ICC2
0.45 ICC1 ICC1 ICC2 ICC2
0.50 ICC1 ICC1 ICC2 ICC2
0.55 ICC1 ICC1 ICC2 ICC2
0.60 ICC1 ICC1 ICC2 ICC2
0.65 ICC1 Sep.Eq. ICC2 ICC2
0.70 ICC1 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
0.75 ICC1 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
0.80 ICC1 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
0.835 Sep.Eq. ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
0.85 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
0.90 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
0.95 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
Table 1: Satisfaction of the ICCs under xed wages
to TR for a wide range of parameters. What about the incentives of NA workers
to choose TC? Clearly, in a separating equilibrium, an NA worker has a strong
incentive to choose TC. As shown above, for a wide range of parameters ( > 0:56
be a su¢ cient condition), failing on TC yields a better reputation than TR. For
an NA worker this means that TC and no e¤ort yields a higher payo¤ than TR.
The intuition why ICC 2 is a strong condition is straightforward. In a world where
workers are only concerned about their reputations for being able, we do not expect
workers to choose actions that reveal that they see themselves as unable.
By emphasizing that ICC 1 is a mild condition, and ICC 2 is a strong condition
we do not want to suggest that a separating equilibrium never exists. The odds for
successfully completing a challenging task are higher for an A worker than for anNA
worker. This creates room for a separating equilibrium. We do want to suggest that
a separating equilibrium exists for a narrow range of parameters. Table 1 illustrates.
It gives for various values of M and  whether ICC 1 or ICC 2 is violated.7 We
7Note that in Table 1 we twice report a 3-decimal value of M . We include these two values to
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have obtained the results for  = 1, W = 12 and M =
1
2
. Table 1 clearly shows
that for values of  close to 0.5, ICC 2 is already violated. Then, an NA worker
chooses TC rather than TR.
An implication of the analysis is that for a wide set of parameters a (semi)
pooling equilibrium exists in which an NA worker chooses the challenging task with
a positive probability.8 In such equilibria, reputations depend to a large degree
on task performance. In environments where workers are predominantly motivated
by reputational concerns, manager can rely only to a limited extent on workers to
self-select with respect to tasks.
5 PerformanceWage with Reputational Concerns
In the previous two sections, we have discussed separately the case that workers are
driven by monetary rewards, and the case that workers are driven by reputational
concerns. In the present section we combine the two. We present two main results.
First, we show that monetary incentives not only directly induce more e¤ort, but
that they also stimulate e¤ort indirectly (through reputational concerns). We argue
that the direct e¤ect of monetary incentives on e¤ort benets the worker, but that
the indirect e¤ect harms him. Second, we show that the combination of monetary
incentives and reputational concerns a¤ects the ICCs of the separating equilibrium.
We nd that in an environment where in the absence of monetary incentives no
separating equilibrium exists because NA workers tend to choose TC, a reward for
successfully completing TC may make a separating equilibrium possible.
How do monetary incentives a¤ect e¤ort choice in the presence of reputational
concerns? Suppose that in our model WTC > 0 and  > 0. One can verify that in a
separating equilibrium of such a model the e¤ort level of an A worker equals
eSE (A) = Pr (t = AjA) [WTC +  [1  ^(TC; F ; eSE (A))]]
with ^(TC; F ; eSE (A)) given by (9). As discussed in the previous section, failing
illustrate that there always exists a separating equilibrium in between a range of M where ICC 1
is violated and a range of M where ICC 2 is violated. The reason is that A workers are strictly
more willing than NA to choose TC.
8For  very close to 12 , and moderate values of M , a pooling equilibrium exists in which both
types of workers choose TR.
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on a challenging task has a large adverse e¤ect on reputation if e¤ort is high. The
implication is a spill-over between monetary rewards and reputational rewards. An
increase in WTC encourages an A worker to exert e¤ort. As a higher e¤ort widens
the reputational gap, an increase in WTC also indirectly motivates an A worker.
Note that the direct e¤ect of WTC on e¤ort is benecial to the worker. He wants to
exert more e¤ort, because completing TC successfully yields a higher reward. The
indirect e¤ect on e¤ort is not benecial for the agent. The manager anticipates the
higher e¤ort level. In equilibrium, in expected terms, the worker cannot improve his
reputation. The extra e¤ort he exerts is costly, however.
The extent to which this spillover is present crucially depends on the value of
M . For values of M close to zero, the spillover is negligible. In such a situation the
reputational gap is close to 1 in the absence of monetary rewards. As a consequence,
wages can hardly widen the gap. For values of M close to 1, the spillover is
also negligible because failing on a challenging task does not harm the reputation
of a worker. The spillover between monetary rewards and reputation might be
substantial for moderate values of M . In such an environment, a higher equilibrium
value of e¤ort widens the gap, and task performance is important for a workers
reputation. As as result, through its e¤ect on reputations, an increase in WTC
induces the agent to exert more e¤ort.
The spillover between monetary and reputational incentives inuences the ICCs.
In the previous section we have argued that the expression [^ (TR)  ^ (TC; F; eSE (A))]
plays a crucial role for the ICCs. We have shown that in the absence of monetary
rewards, failing on TC sometimes leads to a slightly worse reputation than TR, and
often leads to a better reputation than TR. Through its e¤ect on e¤ort, WTC > 0
may make TR attractive from a reputational point of view. Equation (9) implies
that for high equilibrium levels of e¤ort, failing on TC is detrimental for the workers
reputation.
By means of a numerical analysis, we now show that the magnitude of the
e¤ect of the spillover on the ICCs can be decisive for the existence of a separating
equilibrium.9 Columns 1 and 4 in Table 2 show that in the absence of monetary
incentives, for  = 0:53 and  = 0:55 ICC 2 is violated for all values of M . Thus,
9We have obtained the results for  = 1, W = 12 and M =
1
2 .
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 = 0:53  = 0:55
M WTC= 0 WTC= 0:3 WTC= 0:6 WTC= 0 WTC= 0:3 WTC= 0:6
0.05 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
0.10 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
0.15 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
0.20 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
0.225 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
0.25 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
0.30 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
0.35 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
0.40 ICC2 Sep.Eq. Sep.Eq. ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
0.45 ICC2 Sep.Eq. Sep.Eq. ICC2 ICC2 Sep.Eq.
0.50 ICC2 Sep.Eq. Sep.Eq. ICC2 ICC2 Sep.Eq.
0.55 ICC2 Sep.Eq. Sep.Eq. ICC2 ICC2 Sep.Eq.
0.60 ICC2 Sep.Eq. Sep.Eq. ICC2 ICC2 Sep.Eq.
0.65 ICC2 Sep.Eq. ICC1 ICC2 ICC2 Sep.Eq.
0.70 ICC2 ICC2 Sep.Eq. ICC2 ICC2 Sep.Eq.
0.75 ICC2 ICC2 Sep.Eq. ICC2 ICC2 Sep.Eq.
0.80 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
0.835 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
0.85 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
0.90 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
0.95 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2 ICC2
Table 2: Satisfaction of the ICCs under performance wage and reputational concerns
in those settings, no separating equilibrium exists. NA workers have too strong
an incentive to choose TC. The second column of 2 shows that for  = 0:53 and
moderate values of M , and a reward for successfully completing TC, a separating
equilibrium does exist. So, the introduction of a monetary reward for successfully
completing TC may induce NA workers to abstain from performing TC. Column 3
and 6 of Table 2 show that for higher WTC , the scope of the parameters for which
NA workers choose TR widens. Note that for  = 0:53 and M = 0:65, WTC > 0
even discourages an A worker to perform TC.
Why is the e¤ect of WTC on the ICCs potentially so important? The to-
tal e¤ect is a combination of two e¤ects discussed earlier. First, a higher e¤ort
level a¤ects the reputational gap between failing on TC and performing TR. Fig-
ure 3 shows that for moderate values of M , a higher value of WTC increases
[^ (TR)  ^ (TC; F; eSE (A))]. Again, the reason is that for high levels of e¤ort,
failing on TC severely damages the workers reputation. Second, e¤ort directed to
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Figure 3: The potential reputational loss of doing TC;
[^ (TR)  ^ (TC; F; eSE (A))] ; as a function of M for various levels of WTC.
Parameters:  = 0:55; M = 0:5; W = 0:5;  = 1:
improving ones reputation is a waste. E¤ort can a¤ect the probability of complet-
ing a task successfully, but, in our model, does not a¤ect expected reputations. By
choosing TR, the worker can escape from this wasteful cost of e¤ort.
All in all, our numerical analysis shows that in a world where workers care
about money and are concerned about their reputation for being able, a monetary
reward for successfully completing a task can induce workers to shy away from this
task. If one interprets WTC as the price for performing TR, the routine task bears
resemblance of the famous Gi¤en good. A cut in the price of TR leads to less
consumption.
6 Conclusions
This paper has tried to contribute to the literature on how personal characteristics of
managers inuence employeesbehavior and companiesperformance. Our focus has
been on a managers view of workers abilities. We have derived two sets of results.
First, in a model where workers are uncertain about their abilities, we have shown
that in an environment where workers are driven by monetary rewards a positive
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view held by the manager encourages workers to exert e¤ort. In environments where
workers are concerned about their reputation for being able, the e¤ect of a managers
view is more complicated. On the one hand a negative view may challenge workers
to prove themselves. On the other hand, a positive view may improve workers
self-image.
The second set of results pertains to the question whether a manager should
assign tasks to workers or let workers themselves choose tasks. The idea is that
it might be in a managers interest that workers with a positive self-image choose
more challenging tasks, while workers with a negative self-image choose more rou-
tine tasks. We have found that when agents are primarily concerned about their
reputation, the scope for self-selection is very limited. The reason is that in a world
where workers may choose the task they want to perform, a choice for a routine
task is a clear signal of a negative self-view. This damages a workers reputation.
A somewhat surprising result is that increasing the reward for successfully complet-
ing the challenging task may encourage workers to choose more routine tasks. The
reason for this result is a spillover between monetary incentives and reputational
concerns on e¤ort. The direct e¤ect of a higher reward is more e¤ort. More e¤ort,
in turn, leads to a poor reputation in case of failure. Workers can avoid wasteful
e¤ort by choosing the routine task.
As usual, the results of our paper are derived from a model that is based on
many assumptions. Some of them are restrictive, but innocuous. For example, our
assumption that less able workers can never complete a challenging task could be
replaced by the assumption that, ceteris paribus, a less able worker completes a
challenging task with a lower probability than a more able worker. The math would
be slightly more complicated, but the results would not be qualitatively di¤erent.
In the same realm, a less innocuous assumption is that successfully completing a
challenging task is a clear signal of being able, while the routine task functions as a
safe haven. One could imagine situations where failing on the routine task is a clear
signal of being unable. In such an environment, workers are more likely to perform
the challenging task for two reasons. First, in such a model the routine task would
also involve e¤ort. Second, the routine task would no longer play the role as a safe
haven.
An uncommon assumption underlying our model is that the worker infers infor-
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mation about his ability from the managers attitude, while in the model there is
no reason why the managers attitude contains information. Our model is not fully
specied in the sense that the weight the worker attributes to the probability that
the managers attitude towards workers (M) is correct is exogenous. One advantage
of this way of modelling is that it is exible. For instance, if one believes that the
managers attitude does not contain information, one simply sets M to zero. In
that case, the well-known Galatea e¤ect will disappear. However, the more surpris-
ing result that a negative attitude of the manager may encourage workers to exert
e¤ort would survive. One can also easily show that our result that an increase in the
reward for completing a challenging task may discourage workers to perform chal-
lenging tasks does not hinge on any information asymmetry between the manager
and worker. It does require that both the worker and the manager are uncertain
about the workers ability.
Finally, we have assumed an environment in which e¤ort and ability are comple-
ments. In general, our results do not carry over to an environment where e¤ort and
ability are substitutes.
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